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UNBUCKLING THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE IN 
ARKANSAS 
Spencer G. Dougherty* 
INTRODUCTION 
The “seat belt defense” has been hotly litigated over the 
decades in numerous jurisdictions across the United States.  It is 
an affirmative defense that, when allowed, reduces a plaintiff’s 
recovery for personal injuries resulting from an automobile 
collision where the defendant can establish that those injuries 
would have been less severe or avoided entirely had the plaintiff 
been wearing an available seat belt.  This is an unsettled legal 
issue in Arkansas, despite the growing number of cases in which 
the seat belt defense is raised as an issue.  Most jurisdictions, 
including Arkansas, initially rejected the defense,1 but the basis 
for those rejections has grown less compelling over the decades.  
A growing number of states have recognized the defense in recent 
years.2  In light of recent developments in tort law and the factual 
reality of the proven efficacy of seat belts, it is time for the 
Arkansas Supreme Court to revisit the issue and rule definitively 
in favor of allowing evidence of seat belt non-use for damage 
reduction.   
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law.  Note & Comment Editor,
Arkansas Law Review, 2019-2020.  The author sincerely thanks Professor Jill Wieber Lens 
for her thoughtful guidance as faculty advisor, the staff of the Arkansas Law Review for their 
commitment to diligent editing, and his father, mother, and brother for their steadfast support 
throughout the process of drafting this publication.   
1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298. 
2. See generally Admissibility of Seat Belt Non-Use Evidence State by State Guide,
TRAFFIC RESOURCE CTR. FOR JUDGES, [https://perma.cc/D5CV-JA2P] (last visited Jan. 30, 
2020); Gary L. Wickert, Seat Belt Defense in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & 
LEHRER, S.C. (Apr. 25, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8WV7-LQ5B] (“A.C.A. § 27-37-703, 
which made evidence of failure to use a seat belt in a civil action[,] was found 
unconstitutional by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Mendoza v. WIS International . . . . The 
exact implications of this ruling are yet to be determined.”). 
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To Arkansans, and Americans at large, automobiles offer 
historically unprecedented mobility and convenience.3  For over 
a century, the primacy of motor vehicles as the transportation of 
choice for Americans has gone virtually unchallenged.4  The 
American dependence on automobiles came to be in part because 
of the relative accessibility and affordability of motor vehicles 
and in part because the national infrastructure developed 
concurrently with the motor vehicle boom of the twentieth 
century.5  Americans drive, on average, nearly thirty-two miles 
every day, and over 88% of Americans over the age of sixteen 
“reported that they dr[i]ve at least occasionally.”6   
The convenience afforded by car ownership belies a massive 
and tragic human cost: An immense number of injurious and fatal 
traffic accidents occur every year in the United States.7  
Thousands of those injuries and deaths could be prevented every 
year by merely wearing a seat belt; however, in a majority of 
jurisdictions drivers who put themselves and others at risk by not 
using available seat belts face little chance of having to pay for 
their omissions in the courtroom.8  Most states maintain statutes 
prohibiting defendants from presenting evidence of seat belt non-
use to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery.9  The justifications for these 
statutes, while possibly defensible many years ago, no longer 
reflect the public policy of Arkansas or the United States.10 
Like many other states, Arkansas (for decades) maintained a 
statute prohibiting admission of evidence of seat belt non-use for 
3. See Edward Humes, The Absurd Primacy of the Automobile in American Life, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), [https://perma.cc/78JM-EH3D]. 
4. See id.
5. See Alex Taylor III, America’s Love Affair with Its Cars Is Far from Over, FORTUNE
(July 3, 2013), [https://perma.cc/DA8J-9VBR]. 
6. BRIAN TEFFT, AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, AMERICAN DRIVING SURVEY:
2015-2016 (2018), [https://perma.cc/FBE2-KUH6]. 
7. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), USDOT Releases
2016 Fatal Traffic Crash Data (Oct. 6, 2017), [https://perma.cc/9QLS-QEDX]. 
8. See NHTSA, OCCUPANT PROTECTION IN PASSENGER VEHICLES 1, 6 (2018),
[https://perma.cc/AWS8-M9F2]; Wickert, supra note 2. 
9. Steven B. Hantler et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 21, 32 (2005). 
10. See Michelle R. Mangrum, The Seat Belt Defense: Must the Reasonable Man Wear
a Seat Belt?, 50 MO. L. REV. 968, 977-78 (1985). 
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purposes of reducing damages.11  The Arkansas Supreme Court 
overturned the statute in 2016, but its decision seemed motivated 
more by a desire to check the procedural rule-making authority of 
the Arkansas Legislature than to mold evidentiary standards to 
comport with public policy.12  The Court overturned the statute as 
a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, yet failed to rule 
on whether evidence of seat belt non-use would be admissible in 
civil actions moving forward.13  As a result, the state of the law in 
Arkansas is unclear, much to the consternation of both plaintiffs’ 
and defense lawyers.14 
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s newly-reclaimed power to 
write its own procedural rules remains vulnerable to further 
attempts by the legislature to wrest rule-making authority from 
the judiciary through successor ballot initiatives.15  There is little 
question, however, that the time has come for the Arkansas 
Supreme Court and the other relevant judicial rule-making bodies 
to allow admission of evidence of seat belt non-use for allocation 
of comparative fault.16  Continued judicial fence-sitting on the 
issue undermines both the state law requiring drivers to wear seat 
belts and the hard-won public recognition of their efficacy.  This 
Comment analyzes the history of the seat belt defense in the 
United States, with particular emphasis on Arkansas and 
neighboring jurisdictions.  The Comment will then examine the 
current state of the law in Arkansas and advocate for allowing 
admission of evidence of seat belt non-use in Arkansas. 
11. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298. 
12. See Justice J. Brooks, Mendoza v. WIS International, Inc.: The Supreme Court’s
Decision Makes Seat Belt Non-Use Relevant Evidence, 52-WTR ARK. LAW. 34, 34 (2017). 
13. See Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 2016 Ark. 157, 9-10, 490 S.W.3d 298, 303-04.
14. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 34-35.
15. Although Issue 1 was struck from the ballot, it is safe to assume that similar
proposals will follow in the future.  See Joshua M. Silverstein & Jerry Cox, Good Riddance 
to Issue 1, NW. ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Oct. 21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/TDB6-
NMN8]. 
16. The Policy Basis for Seat Belt Evidence Gag Statutes No Longer Exists, TAYLOR |
ANDERSON, LLP (Nov. 7, 2016), [https://perma.cc/CJN2-U5NJ]. 
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I. BACKGROUND
When a careless driver rear-ends another vehicle and causes 
injuries to its passengers, the question of liability would normally 
be straightforward.  The offending driver, or his or her insurance, 
would assume total liability for the injuries and compensate the 
aggrieved party.17  However, if that injured party were somehow 
at fault in the accident in some way, they would be expected to 
have their damages reduced according to their percentage of 
fault.18  This notion of comparative fault is not novel or 
controversial.  If, for example, the plaintiff was not wearing his 
or her seat belt and suffered much worse injuries as a result, the 
logical conclusion would be that the plaintiff contributed to the 
proximate cause of their injuries and would therefore be subject 
to a reduction in damages based on their percentage of fault.  This 
is the rationale behind the seat belt defense.  It is a relatively 
simple theory which provides that in an accident where the 
injured person was not wearing a seat belt, the responsible party 
may use the defense to reduce their liability by the amount of 
damages that would have been avoided if the person had been 
wearing their seat belt.  Even though the rationale seems simple 
enough, for one reason or another, a shrinking majority of states 
prohibit defendants from employing the defense by statute.   
A. Motivations for Enacting Exclusionary Provisions
In the 1980s the federal government began to aggressively 
promote seat belt initiatives which eventually led to most states 
adopting mandatory seat belt use statutes.  The National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a 
regulation in 1984 requiring all passenger vehicles beginning with 
the 1990 model year to include passive restraints such as seat belts 
and air bags unless states constituting over two-thirds of the 
17. See Charles R. Gueli, All About Rear-End Accident Claims and Injury
Compensation, INJ. CLAIM COACH, [https://perma.cc/9CLC-44UQ] (last visited Feb. 3, 
2020). 
18. See Car Accident Liability: Proving Fault in a Car Crash, FINDLAW,
[https://perma.cc/VQ9T-AEPS] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020). 
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nation’s population adopted mandatory seat belt statutes.19  By 
1987, a majority of states, including Texas, responded by passing 
mandatory seat belt use statutes.20  Arkansas followed suit in 
1991.21  Many of these statutes (including those passed by 
Arkansas and Texas) included provisions barring the admission 
of failure to wear a seat belt as evidence in civil actions.22   
At the time, there were legitimate policy justifications for 
including the exclusionary provisions.  When the NHTSA 
regulation went into effect, less than 13% of motor vehicle 
occupants nationwide regularly used seat belts.23  Car 
manufacturers had only recently been required to install seat belts 
as standard equipment on all passenger vehicles, and much of the 
public remained skeptical of seat belts’ effectiveness in 
preventing injuries.24   
The exclusionary provisions were also in large part enacted 
at a time in which many states maintained harsh comparative fault 
schemes capable of completely barring an otherwise-innocent 
plaintiff’s recoverable damages for failure to wear a seat belt.25  
Courts and legislatures were understandably “hesitant to allow a 
jury to deprive a plaintiff who was not wearing a seatbelt of all 
recovery against the person who negligently caused the 
accident.”26  Although a majority of states now operate under 
gentler, modified comparative fault schemes, many of the 
exclusionary provisions have yet to be updated or discarded.27 
19. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 49 Fed. Reg.
28,962-01, 28,962 (July 17, 1984) (codified as amended at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208). 
20. Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex. 2015); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 545.412(d), 545.413(g) (West 2015) (relevant subsections repealed 
2003). 
21. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298. 
22. Admissibility of Seat Belt Non-Use Evidence State by State Guide, supra note 2;
Wickert, supra note 2 
23. Peter Scaff, The Final Piece of the Seat Belt Evidence Puzzle, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
1371, 1377 n.33 (1999). 
24. See id. at 1377-78.
25. See Hantler et al., supra note 9, at 35.
26. See id.
27. See Wickert, supra note 2.
140 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:1 
The most commonly cited rationale for barring admissibility 
is the purported “absence of a duty to wear a seat belt.”28  Courts 
in these jurisdictions reason that, where there is no duty, a jury 
should not be able to reduce a plaintiff’s damages for failure to 
wear an available seat belt.29  Increasingly, however, evolving 
public policy in many jurisdictions is eroding the rationales 
against allowing admission of evidence of seat belt non-use.   
B. The Unsettled State of the Law in Arkansas
Arkansas’s history with the seat belt defense closely mirrors 
that of many other states that grappled with the issue.  Originally, 
under the common law of Arkansas, a passenger’s failure to “use 
a seat belt constituted ‘fault’ under the comparative fault statute 
and [was] admissible in[to] evidence,” so long as that “failure was 
a proximate cause of [the plaintiff’s] injuries.”30  However, in 
1991 the Arkansas legislature passed a statute mandating seat belt 
use that also contained an exclusionary provision.31  For over two 
decades, section 27-37-703 of the Arkansas Code (a “gag” 
statute) barred defendants from introducing evidence of a 
plaintiff’s non-use of a seat belt in lawsuits arising from motor 
vehicle collisions.32  Arkansas’s gag statute barred evidence of a 
plaintiff’s potentially negligent failure to use a seat belt from 
reaching the jury, even when wearing a seat belt would have fully 
prevented or lessened the plaintiff’s injuries.33  Arkansas courts 
dutifully upheld the statute between 1991 and 2015 on the basis 
of the unfair prejudice associated with allowing evidence of seat 
belt non-use into the courtroom.34  However, as early as 1999 
28. Mangrum, supra note 10, at 977-78 (citing Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1970); Taplin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); D.W. Boutwell Butane 
Co. v. Smith, 244 So.2d 11, 13 (Miss. 1971); Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (Wash. 
1988) (en banc)). 
29. See id. at 978.
30. HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, LAW OF DAMAGES § 27:2 (6th ed.
2014). 
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298 (“The failure of an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and 
fastened seat belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action.”). 
32. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703.
33. Brooks, supra note 12, at 34.
34. Allen v. Greenland, 347 Ark. 465, 475, 65 S.W.3d 424, 432 (2002).
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some Arkansas Supreme Court justices began to question the 
statute’s validity.35  
In 2016, the Arkansas Supreme Court substantially muddied 
the waters in Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.36  In that case, a motor 
vehicle passenger brought suit against a driver and his employer 
for personal injuries suffered in a collision.37  The plaintiff was 
not wearing a seat belt.38  The driver and his employer sought to 
introduce evidence to that effect and challenge the 
constitutionality of section 27-37-703.39  Unsure of how to 
proceed, the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Arkansas submitted a certified question to the Arkansas 
Supreme Court: “[D]oes section 27-37-703, which restricts the 
admissibility of seat belt non-use evidence in civil actions, violate 
the separation-of-powers doctrine found in article IV, section 2, 
of the Arkansas Constitution?”40   
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and ruled 
the gag statute unconstitutional, but for reasons which were 
fundamentally different from the public policy considerations 
relied upon by other states such as Texas.41  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court recognized the legislature’s power to make 
substantive law through statute but unequivocally asserted its 
authority to determine the rules of evidence.42  In the Court’s 
view, the statute represented an unconstitutional usurpation of 
judicial rule-making authority by the state legislature because it 
entirely restricted a certain kind of evidence from entering the 
courtroom.43  Justice Danielson, who authored the opinion, 
notably wrote “If we were to grant authority to the legislature to 
determine the relevancy of evidence in court proceedings, we 
35. Grummer v. Cummings, 336 Ark. 447, 451, 986 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1999) (Imber, J.,
concurring). 
36. See Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298.
37. Id. at 2, 490 S.W.3d at 300.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1, 490 S.W.3d 298, 299.
41. Compare Nabors Well Serv., LTD. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 564 (Tex. 2015),
with Mendoza, 2016 Ark. at 9-10, 490 S.W.3d at 303-04. 
42. Mendoza, at 9-10, 490 S.W.3d at 303-04 (quoting State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 7,
800 S.W.2d 402, 404 (1990) (“[W]hen conflicts arise between legislation and rules of 
evidence and procedure, ‘[the court’s] rules remain supreme.’”)).  
43. Id. at 9-10, 490 S.W.3d at 303-04.
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would be depriving the trial courts of their exclusive authority to 
determine the relevancy of evidence[, thereby creating] an absurd 
result.”44  The Court therefore held that, as an evidentiary rule of 
procedure, section 27-37-703 violated the separation-of-powers 
doctrine and overruled the statute.   
The split Mendoza decision, wherein three justices 
dissented, highlighted a long-simmering and continuously-
developing power struggle between the two branches of the 
Arkansas government concerning rule-making related to the 
pleading, practice, and procedure of Arkansas courts.45  Two of 
the dissenting justices reasoned the facts of the case were not even 
applicable to the “Failure to Comply” statute and that the Court 
needed not address the events of the Mendoza case outside of the 
scope of the certified question.46  Justices Hart and Wood opined 
in their dissents that Arkansas Rule of Evidence 402 gave the state 
legislature the authority to statutorily determine evidentiary 
relevance in court cases.47  By that logic, because the legislature 
had determined that seat belt non-use was irrelevant in its statute, 
the dissenting justices would have held the gag provision as 
constitutional.48  Although the majority was not convinced by that 
argument, the question still gave the Court pause enough to direct 
the Civil Practice Committee to review Rule 402 to determine 
whether the rule as currently written indeed does endow the 
legislature with evidentiary rule-making authority.49  If so, 
observers can expect significant changes to Rule 402 to place 
44. Id. at 9, 490 S.W.3d at 303.
45. See id. at 10, 490 S.W.3d at 304.
46. Id. at 10-11, 490 S.W.3d at 304 (Baker, K., dissenting); id. at 11-19, 490 S.W.3d
at 304-09 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
47. ARK. R. EVID. 402. (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by statute.”). 
48. See Mendoza, 2016 Ark. at 11-19, 490 S.W.3d at 308-09 (Hart, J., dissenting); id.
at 19, 490 S.W.3d at 308-09 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Brooks, supra note 13, at 35. 
49. See Mendoza, 2016 Ark. at 6, 9, 490 S.W.3d at 302, 303 n.1 (“We request our Civil
Practice Committee to review Rule 402 in light of this opinion.  To the extent that any other 
rules of evidence conflict with Johnson v. Rockwell, we refer those rules to the Committee 
for review as well.”) (citing Johnson v. Rockwell, 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 
(overturning a statute as violating the separation-of-powers doctrine when it “limited the 
evidence that may be introduced relating to the value of medical expenses, thereby dictating 
what evidence is admissible.”)). 
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even more evidentiary rule-making power within the realm of the 
judiciary.  
The Arkansas defense bar, which long fought to assert 
plaintiffs’ comparative fault for failure to wear available seat 
belts, understandably believed they had achieved a significant 
victory.  Defense attorneys in the state pointed to the greater 
severity of injury associated with failure to wear a seat belt as 
justification for their position.50  The practical effects of making 
evidence of non-use admissible are obvious—reductions in 
plaintiffs’ damages based on juries’ newfound proclivities for 
assigning fault for failure to wear seat belts when it becomes 
evident that the plaintiff’s injuries would have been less severe 
had the plaintiff been wearing a seat belt.   
Although the initial reaction might have been to conclude 
that evidence of seat belt non-use now constitutes relevant and 
admissible evidence, that question remains very much up in the 
air.  Although Mendoza was conclusive on the separation-of-
powers issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court failed to specifically 
answer one crucial question: whether, after the rejection of 
section 27-37-703, evidence of non-use of a seat belt is now 
relevant and admissible for purposes of a jury’s comparative fault 
analysis.51  In the wake of Mendoza, Arkansas law regarding 
admissibility is now unsettled at best and headache-inducing at 
worst.52  It is an issue drenched in confusion.  Litigators on both 
sides of the issue struggle to discern and then articulate the law 
relating to the admissibility of evidence of seat belt non-use.53  
The issue requires resolution, irrespective of whether that 
resolution comes from the judiciary.  
The Arkansas Supreme Court has, in recent years, taken a 
strong stance against the legislature commandeering judicial rule-
making authority.54  This power struggle between the two 
branches has taken place in various arenas, with the most notable 
50. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 35.
51. The Court’s opinion focused on the separation-of-powers issue and failed to make
any explicit determination as to whether evidence of seat belt non-use would be admissible 
moving forward.  See id. at 34-35.   
52. See id. at 35.
53. See id.
54. Max Brantley, Judge Pierce Says Issue One Is Unconstitutional and Should Be
Removed from the Ballot, ARK. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), [https://perma.cc/2SLB-36E3]. 
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example constituting the Issue 1 “Tort Reform” measure, which, 
had it not been struck from the ballot, would have given complete 
judicial rule-making authority to the legislature.55  If the Arkansas 
electorate had voted in favor of Issue 1, it is likely that the 
legislature would have passed merely another gag statute barring 
admission of evidence of seat belt non-use.56  However, the Court 
remains the entity in charge of its rule-making authority and, at 
some point, will have to address the viability of the seat belt 
defense definitively.   
II. ANALYSIS
In the wake of the Mendoza case, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court has established its rule-making authority for evidentiary 
matters and is now the entity responsible for determining whether 
evidence of seat belt non-use is admissible as evidence of a 
plaintiff’s comparative fault.  The most equitable course the Court 
can take when next presented with the issue is to rule that such 
evidence is admissible—doing so would be fairer to both sides if 
a plaintiff did indeed act negligently by not wearing a seat belt.  
One thing is clear—the confusion stemming from the law as it 
stands now benefits none and will not go away until the Court 
definitively rules one way or another.  
A. Arkansas’s Comparative Fault Scheme Allows for Fair
Apportionment of Damages Without Fully Barring Non-
Negligent Plaintiffs from Recovery 
Arkansas courts rendered the decisions barring seat belt use 
as evidence of a plaintiff’s negligence at a time that an all-or-
nothing rule applied.  However, given that the modern 
comparative fault scheme has largely alleviated this concern, the 
law barring seat belt use as evidence of a plaintiff’s negligence 
should not be applied by courts in a state like Arkansas that no 
longer abides by an all-or-nothing contributory negligence 
55. Id.
56. See Roby Brock, Will Tort Reform Return?, TALK BUS. & POLITICS (Feb. 3, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/ZXA8-VT87]. 
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scheme.57  Arkansas’s comparative fault infrastructure is well-
established and well-suited to accommodate the seat belt defense 
as a method of reducing damages for failure to comply with the 
seat belt statute and the standard of ordinary care, just as jurors 
reduce damages for violation of any other legal duty.  While 
evidence of seat belt non-use, if allowed, would reduce a 
plaintiff’s damages, the average person overwhelmingly 
understands the safety benefits of seat belt use and an average 
individual would likely consider non-use to be quite risky.58  Pre-
comparative fault objections are no longer on point both because 
there appears to be a duty to wear available seat belts and because 
plaintiffs should not fear to suffer a complete loss of damages so 
long as they are not more at fault than defendants.59  A plaintiff 
suffering damages is still entitled to recovery so long as his or her 
responsibility is not higher than that of the defendant’s.60   
B. Seat Belt Use Is an Exercise of Ordinary Care
Just as most tort duties originate from statutes, Arkansas’s 
mandatory seat belt use law strongly suggests the existence of a 
duty of ordinary care to wear available seat belts, and failure to 
comply with this duty now represents a breach of the general duty 
to exercise reasonable care for one’s safety.  The public policy 
rationales underlying states adopting gag statutes now seem 
archaic and unpersuasive considering the increasing public favor 
towards seat belt use and jurisdictional acceptance of seat belt use 
as an exercise of ordinary care.  Arkansas’s seat belt statute 
mandates that drivers and front seat passengers of motor vehicles 
wear seat belts.61  Failure to comply with this statute, while not 
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (1991).
58. See generally NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-456,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: SEAT BELT USE IN 2017—OVERALL RESULTS (Apr. 
2018), [https://perma.cc/YJ4W-SF7U].   
59. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(b)(1) (1991) (“If the fault chargeable to a party
claiming damages is of a lesser degree than the fault chargeable to the party or parties from 
whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is entitled to 
recover the amount of his or her damages after they have been diminished in proportion to 
the degree of his or her own fault.”). 
61. The statutory duty to wear a seat belt comes from ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-702
(2003).  Would not a violation of this statute constitute negligence per se, or at least strong 
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necessarily negligence per se, should be considered by a jury as 
evidence of fault.  Even the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions 
reference failure to wear a seat belt (a violation of state law) as 
evidence of negligence.62  It’s past time for the Arkansas Supreme 
Court to definitively rule in favor of allowing evidence of seat 
belt non-use into the courtroom.   
Seat belt non-use fits squarely into the definition of 
unreasonable conduct.  Arkansas law defines “fault” as “any act, 
omission, conduct, the risk assumed, breach of warranty, or 
breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any 
damages sustained by any party.”63  A breach of the duty of 
ordinary care is considered proximate cause under the 
comparative fault structure, and a growing number of 
jurisdictions recognize a common law duty of ordinary care to 
wear seat belts.64  Even Arkansas’s common law seems to suggest 
the existence of a duty to wear available seat belts.   
Before the State’s legislature implemented the now-defunct 
gag statute, Arkansas courts generally expressed a willingness to 
allow juries to assess fault to plaintiffs for failure to wear a seat 
belt if defendants were able to prove that the omission constituted 
a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.65  The most 
illustrative case in support of this proposition was Potts v. 
Benjamin, in which the Eighth Circuit predicted that Arkansas 
juries could assess a percentage of fault against a plaintiff if the 
defendant could demonstrate the degree to which using a seat belt 
would have reduced the plaintiff’s injuries.66  The Eighth Circuit 
evidence of negligence, to assess corresponding damage reductions?  See Ark. Model Jury 
Instr., Civil AMI 601. 
62. See Ark. Model Jury Instr., Civil AMI 601.
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122.
64. See Baker v. Morrison, 309 Ark. 457, 462, 829 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1992)
(“appellants’ failure to wear their seatbelts was a failure to exercise ordinary care”); Bentzler 
v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (Wis. 1967) (“[A]s a matter of common knowledge, an
occupant of an automobile either knows or should know of the additional safety factor
produced by the use of seatbelts.”); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Wyo.
1992) (recognizing a parent’s common-law duty to buckle a minor passenger’s seatbelt in
light of statistics confirming the often dire results of failure to do so).
65. See Baker, 309 Ark. at 462, 829 S.W.2d at 423.
66. The Arkansas Supreme Court later validated the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning.  See
Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir. 1989) (predicting Arkansas law would 
allow the admissibility of the plaintiff’s failure to wear seatbelt as evidence of comparative 
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further interpreted Arkansas law to hold that, even in the absence 
of a statute requiring use, failure to wear an available seat belt 
would constitute negligence under the general common-law 
standard of ordinary care.67   
A plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt would certainly 
resemble proximate cause (under the usual understanding of the 
term) if that failure to wear a seat belt, in a natural and continued 
sequence, caused those injuries, and without that failure, the 
injuries would not have occurred.  The Arkansas Supreme Court 
further held in Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tucker that a plaintiff’s 
non-use of a seat belt could become an issue for the jury to the 
extent that that non-use could be connected with the injuries she 
sustained.68  Although the court in Mendoza did not rule on the 
specific admissibility of seatbelt non-use, the Eighth Circuit 
predicted in 1989 that failure to wear an available seatbelt would 
constitute admissible evidence of comparative fault.69   
C. Public Attitudes Toward Seat Belt Use Support Allowing
the Defense 
The Texas Supreme Court’s recent pivot towards allowing 
the seat belt defense reflects the shifting public attitude towards 
allowing the seat belt defense, and its public policy considerations 
should be quite persuasive for the Arkansas Supreme Court.  
Texas’s longtime prohibition and recent allowance of the seat belt 
defense represents a compelling historical corollary to the current 
state of the law in Arkansas.  For over “forty years[,] evidence of 
a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt [was] inadmissible in car-
accident cases” in Texas.70  The Texas Supreme Court first 
implemented the rule “in 1974[] to offer[] plaintiffs safe harbor 
from the harshness of an all-or-nothing comparative fault 
scheme.”71  The Texas legislature statutorily prohibited evidence 
fault); Baker, 309 Ark. at 461, 829 S.W.2d at 423 (“we think Benjamin correctly applied 
Arkansas law”). 
67. See Potts, 882 F.2d at 1322.
68. See Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Trucker, 295 Ark. 260, 263-64, 748 S.W.2d 136,
137-38 (1988).
69. See Potts, 882 F.2d at 1323.
70. See Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tex. 2015).
71. Id.
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of seat belt non-use in all civil cases but then repealed that law in 
2003, leaving the Supreme Court’s rule to stand alone.72  
Although the rule may have been appropriate in its time, by 2015, 
the Court recognized in Nabors Well Services, Ltd. v. Romero that 
its prohibition on seat belt evidence had become an 
“anachronism.”73  The Court rejected the rule as a vestige of an 
old “legal system and an oddity in light of modern societal 
norms.”74   
The Romero Court centered its decision in part on statutory 
interpretation based on the legislature’s overhaul of Texas’s 
comparative fault scheme from an all-or-nothing bar into a 
mechanism allowing juries to apportion negligence to plaintiffs 
without entirely barring the plaintiff’s recovery.75  The state’s 
updated comparative fault scheme now both allows and requires 
jurors to consider pre-occurrence, injury-causing conduct such as 
seat belt non-use.76  The second and strongest prong of the 
Romero decision recognized the sound public policy rationale 
behind allowing the seat belt defense.77  The Court recognized 
that the law required seat belt use as an unquestioned part of daily 
life for the vast majority of drivers and passengers.78 While the 
Court did acknowledge the abundance of research establishing 
that seat belts reduce injuries and save lives, it refused to belabor 
the point with statistics.79  To do so, the Court held, would be to 
acknowledge the existence of a long-ended debate over the 
propriety of seat belt use.80  The Court refused to maintain “a 
contradictory legal system [that] punished seat-belt nonuse with 
criminal citations while allowing plaintiffs in civil lawsuits to 




75. See Romero, 456 S.W.3d at 559 (“Gone is the harsh system of absolute victory or
total defeat.” (quoting Parker v. Highland Park Inc., 565 S.W. 2d 512, 518 (Tex. 1978))).  In 
Texas, a plaintiff is now entitled to a recovery reduced by his responsibility percentage, so 
long as his responsibility does not exceed 50%.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 33.001 (1995). 
76. Romero, 456 S.W.3d at 564.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 555.
79. Id. at 565.
80. Id.
81. Romero, 456 S.W.3d at 565.
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The American public in the twenty-first century mostly 
understands and appreciates the life-saving capability of seat belts 
and the risks associated with failure to use them.  In 2016 alone, 
motor vehicle crashes in the United States caused 37,461 fatalities 
and over 2.7 million serious injuries.82  Over half of those killed 
in passenger vehicles between the ages of 13 to 44 were not 
wearing seat belts at the time of the crash.83  NHTSA estimates 
that seat belt use would have prevented approximately half of 
those fatalities and injuries.84  Although the numbers are bleak, 
increased seat belt use has contributed to a general downward 
trend in traffic fatalities over the past decade.85  Seat belts saved 
nearly 15,000 lives in 2016.86   
In light of the available statistics, it is no small wonder that 
the public at large today acknowledges the importance of seat belt 
use.  Seat belt use nationwide has increased steadily since the turn 
of the century.87  In 2017, an estimated 89.7% of all motor vehicle 
occupants nationwide routinely used seat belts.88  This sentiment 
is also nearly universally reflected in state law—forty-nine states 
have statutes in place requiring seat belt use and sanctioning 
motorists who fail to use them.89  Even the common law of many 
jurisdictions, deliberative as it may be, now considers seat belt 
use to be an exercise of reasonable care.90   
82. See generally NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-456, 2016
FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW (2017), [https://perma.cc/7UZE-8CSG] 
[2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES]; CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERALL MV-OCCUPANT NONFATAL 
EMERGENCY DEP’T VISITS AND RATES PER 100,000 (2016), [https://perma.cc/CJ8T-PLXN]. 
83. NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-494, TRAFFIC SAFETY 
FACTS: 2016 DATA (2018), [https://perma.cc/75VF-MZ3N]. 
84. See id.
85. 2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, supra note 82.
86. See generally NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-454,
LIVES SAVED IN 2016 BY RESTRAINT USE AND MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS (2017), 
[https://perma.cc/TY5P-KYQJ]. 
87. 2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. See generally INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY & HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST.,
SEAT BELTS—LAWS (2019), [https://perma.cc/WMU2-L42S]. 
90. See, e.g., Baker v. Morrison, 309 Ark. 457, 462, 829 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1992)
(“appellants’ failure to wear their seat belts was a failure to exercise ordinary care”); Bentzler 
v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639-40 (Wis. 1967) (“[T]here is a duty, based on the common
law standard of ordinary care, to use available seat belts independent of any statutory
mandate . . . . [I]t is obvious that, on the average, persons using seat belts are less likely to 
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The national consciousness of expecting motorists to use 
available seat belts predictably permeates the courtroom.  Just as 
the first question people often ask in the immediate aftermath of 
a car accident is whether the occupant was wearing a seat belt, 
jurors deliberating civil cases concerning automobile accidents 
undoubtedly harbor the same question.91  Although the question 
of whether a claimant injured in a car crash failed to wear a seat 
belt would seem germane to a jury’s assessment of damages, 
many states (including, until recently, Arkansas) maintain statutes 
that completely bar or severely restrict admission of evidence of 
seat belt non-use.92  These gag statutes prohibit defense lawyers 
in those jurisdictions from asserting the seat belt defense to reduce 
a claimant’s damages for injuries that seat belt use by the claimant 
would likely have mitigated or prevented.93  To understand why 
these exclusionary provisions exist in such an apparent 
contradiction of public policy, it is crucial to address the 
underlying rationales that existed at the time of their enactment.  
Decades ago, the public harbored skepticism towards the 
effectiveness and safety of seat belt use.94  This skepticism in 
large part led many states to enact gag statutes that still exist 
today.  Many states implemented these laws at a time where cars 
were not all built with seat belts, and many states did not have 
laws requiring seat belt use.95  Now, the public expectation 
(enshrined by statute in most states) is that drivers will use 
available seat belts when on the road.  As noted by the Texas 
Supreme Court, any debate over the effectiveness of seat belts has 
sustain injury and, if injured, the injuries are likely to be less serious . . . . [A]s a matter of 
common knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or should know of the 
additional safety factor produced by the use of seat belts.”). 
91. Steven B. Hantler, Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 21, 32 (2005). 
92. See id.
93. See Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1989) (predicting that the
Arkansas Supreme Court would, in the absence of a statute requiring use, consider non-use 
of a seat belt to constitute a proximate cause of a claimant’s injury if some or all of the 
damages sustained would not have occurred had the seat belt been worn); Baker v. Morrison, 
309 Ark. 457, 461, 829 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1992) (“Benjamin correctly applied Arkansas 
law”); Brooks, supra note 12, at 34. 
94. See Mangrum, supra note 10, at 978.
95. See Brian T. Bagley, The Seat Belt Defense in Texas, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 707, 716-
17 (2004). 
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long ended.96  Those concerns are no longer on point, and the 
Arkansas Supreme Court, when next confronted with the issue, 
will have an opportunity to bring the state’s common law into 
accordance with the well-developed public recognition of the life-
saving ability of seat belt use.  Arkansas should join a growing 
number of states that have recently dumped their anachronistic 
gag statutes.97  It is past time for the state’s top court to lend 
judicial recognition to the effectiveness of seat belts and 
recognize that violation of the statutorily imposed duty to use 
available seat belts itself constitutes negligence for damage 
reduction.   
It is essential to remember that every collision case in which 
a trial judge allows the defendant to assert the seat belt defense 
diminishes an otherwise innocent plaintiff’s ability to collect full 
damages for their injuries.98  The result can be a harsh outcome in 
which a negligent defendant arguably escapes full liability for 
blaming an injured person for their injuries.99  Trial judges 
presiding over these cases should be mindful that to allow the 
defense does, to some extent, punish an otherwise innocent party.  
However, if the plaintiff is unfairly prejudiced, the trial judge will 
retain broad discretion to bar nonprobative evidence of seat belt 
non-use.  Even if the Arkansas Supreme Court does definitively 
classify seat belt non-use as relevant evidence, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
will still have a line of defense available that could exclude this 
96. An increasing number of state supreme courts and federal courts recognize the
policy justifications for allowing the seat belt defense.  See Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. 
Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 565 (Tex. 2015); see, e.g., Carlson v. Ferris, 85 P.3d 504, 510 
(Colo. 2003); Waterson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 A.2d 357, 373 (N.J. 1988). 
97. Idaho (2014 Idaho Sess. Laws 793, 795 (repealed 2014)), Oklahoma (2013 Okla.
Sess. Laws 1, 3 (repealed 2013)), and Texas (1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1643, 1643-44 
(repealed 2003)) are three states that have invalidated gag provisions through either statutory 
action or judicial mandate. 
98. 1 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 4:4 (3d ed. 2019).
99. Id. (“In contributory negligence jurisdictions, one reason why the seat belt defense
has been disfavored is because of the harshness of the result of denying plaintiff any recovery 
even though his or her failure to wear a seat belt did not cause the initial accident.  This 
objection has been obviated in pure comparative negligence systems, since the plaintiff’s 
recovery may be reduced proportionately rather than totally barred.  However, in modified 
comparative negligence systems which utilize the “50-50” or “49-51” formulas, the objection 
is still pertinent, since admitting evidence of nonuse of a seat belt as comparative negligence 
could tip the balance against the plaintiff in the final allocation of the parties’ respective 
negligence, resulting in a denial of recovery for [the] plaintiff.”). 
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evidence any time it unfairly prejudices the plaintiff.  Rule 403 of 
the Arkansas Rules of Evidence dictates that a court may still 
exclude any relevant evidence if its risk of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs its probative value.100  Arkansas case law 
before the imposition of the gag provision frequently held in 
certain cases that evidence of seat belt non-use might impose 
unfair prejudice in negligence cases.101  If the Arkansas Supreme 
Court does definitively rule that evidence of non-use is relevant, 
as it should, courts will likely apply Rule 403 on a case-by-case 
basis, as they do for any other piece of evidence.  This fight over 
prejudice will take place in the courtroom, where it belongs, 
rather than being arbitrarily barred by statute before defendants 
can even introduce the evidence.   
D. Allowing Admission of Evidence of Seat Belt Non-Use Is
a Positive Step Towards Fully Informing Juries 
Given the enormous stakes that often accompany jury 
decisions, we expect juries to render decisions considering all 
relevant facts in the case.  The jury is the most critical mechanism 
in the American judicial system for safeguarding individual 
rights.  Hiding evidence of seat belt non-use from juries in 
Arkansas deprives the fact finder of crucial information, which 
then prevents them from proportionally allocating damage 
awards.  Jurors cannot be expected to decide a case fairly when 
relevant evidence, such as evidence of seat belt non-use, is hidden 
from them by statute in apparent contrast to the principal of liberal 
admission of evidence espoused by the judiciary.  As previously 
discussed, preventing evidence of seat belt non-use from reaching 
the jury goes against the scientifically-accepted safety benefits 
and public understanding associated with seat belts and 
undermines the very state law that requires their use in motor 
vehicles.  Preventing a jury from assessing such an essential fact 
100. Even if the seat belt defense is affirmatively allowed, plaintiffs are not
automatically disadvantaged.  If a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt had minimal bearing 
on the damages suffered, and a jury would be likely to view the plaintiff negatively for that 
failure in spite of the limited factual relevance, the court would exclude that evidence under 
Rule 403.  See ARK. R. EVID. 403.   
101. See Gummer v. Cummings, 336 Ark. 447, 986 S.W.2d 91 (1999).
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in determining damages, even when the seat belt use is wholly 
relevant to a case and might have prevented death or severe 
injury, seems contradictory to notions of justice that the legal 
system demands and taints any determination made without that 
evidence.   
The Arkansas judiciary must allow juries to consider 
evidence of seat belt non-use when allocating fault.  Courts 
entrust jurors with the responsibility of making factual 
determinations to make fully informed decisions and should not 
then expect fair outcomes when they prevent access to crucial 
evidence in adherence to a now-defunct doctrine.  Courts must 
recognize the jury’s ability to weigh the value of a piece of 
evidence and determine whether that evidence might warrant a 
reduction in damages.  Any fight over whether a jury should be 
able to consider evidence of seat belt non-use should not be 
decided by statute before any legal proceedings take place—it 
should be resolved in front of a judge.  
CONCLUSION 
Arkansans know that seat belts save lives and understand the 
risks of not using them on the road.  The public views the notion 
of seat belt non-use much more unfavorably now than it did when 
states, such as Arkansas, implemented gag provisions prohibiting 
their introduction to establish comparative fault.  In this 
contemporary age, reasonable individuals know that by not 
buckling up, they put themselves at risk of severe harm in the 
event of a collision.  A growing number of states are tossing aside 
their exclusionary provisions in recognition of the current 
comparative fault climate and overwhelming public opinion in 
support of encouraging and mandating seat belt use.  It is time for 
the Arkansas judiciary to lead from the front and recognize the 
statutory and common law duty to wear a seat belt and hold 
individuals equally accountable in negligence actions for their 
omissions.   
